Capt. Miller’s Nelliaddy attack gave birth to the Black Tigers

The LTTE was unable to honour these Black Tigers openly because of the negative publicity involved. So they were honoured privately and anonymously as unknown heroes

Vallipuram Vasanthan alias “Captain Miller” the first suicide bomber of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) is the focus of this two-part article. A brief description of the pioneering “Black Tiger” or “Karumpuli” and events leading to the first Black Tiger operation on 5 July 1987 was outlined in the first part published last week (https://www.ft.lk/columns/Capt-Miller-the-LTTE-s-first-Black-Tiger-suicide-bomber/4-764150). Details of the LTTE attack on the military camp at the Nelliaddy MMV school premises would be related in this second and concluding part.

As stated earlier the Sri Lankan Armed Forces had re-taken control of the Vadamaratchi sector in the Northern Jaffna peninsula through “Operation Liberation” launched on 27 May 1987. The army may have continued with the military push and attempted to seize control of Jaffna town but for Indian intervention. 

India conducted “Operation Poomaalai” on 4 June 1987. What India did was to air drop food supplies in various parts of the peninsula through Indian Air Force planes. It was claimed that Jaffna was undergoing a severe food shortage bordering on starvation due to the military operation. Therefore India was conducting a humanitarian operation to deliver food to the people of Jaffna. Even though the ostensible purpose of “Operation Poomaalai” was to deliver food, the implicit political message to Colombo was to suspend all military operations. Colombo was indirectly warned to stay away from Jaffna. “Thus far and no further” was the Lakshmana Rekha drawn by New Delhi.

The Sri Lankan armed forces therefore dug into the new areas they had retaken from LTTE control and consolidated their positions. Plans to advance further on ground were put on hold. An uneasy calm prevailed in the North but the LTTE ousted from Vadamaratchy was exceedingly bitter and angry.

As mentioned earlier, the military setback was a big blow to the LTTE as the Vadamaratchy division was considered to be the impregnable fortress of the Tigers then. A host of LTTE leaders including Prabhakaran, Mahathaya, Kittu, Johnny, Vaasu and Soosai hailed from the Vadamaratchy area. So the fall of Vadamaratchy was a prestige issue for the Tigers. Vadamaratchy cadres like Miller were under emotional strain because of this.

More importantly the fall of Vadamaratchy had also diminished the confidence the people had in the LTTE. The people of Jaffna had believed that the Tigers would confine the army to the barracks thereby keeping most areas in Jaffna devoid of a military presence. If Vadamaratchy the LTTE citadel could be re-captured then the rest of Jaffna too could be captured by the army, felt the people.

TELO

The fall of Vadamaratchy was an embarrassment for the Tigers in another respect too. The TELO in earlier times had a very strong contingent in the Vadamaratchy area. Das, the TELO commander for Vadamarathy, was a military legend in his own right having led the successful attacks in Chavakachcheri and Murigandy. While he was alive the TELO was the dominant force in hinterland areas of the Vadamaratchy such as Udupiddy, Karaveddy, Puloly, Alvai, Thunnalai and Manthigai, The LTTE was stronger in the littoral areas such as Thondamanaru, Valvettithurai, Poligandy, Point Pedro and Thikkam. As long as Das ruled the TELO roost the LTTE could not make much headway in certain Vadamaratchy areas.

The TELO had later broken up into two factions with Das leading one and Bobby the other. Sri Sabaratnam the TELO supremo sided with Bobby. Das and his deputy Peter “Annachi” along with some other seniors were deceived by Srisabaratnam who spoke about a peaceful settlement of the split. Believing Srisabaratnam, Das and Peter went unarmed to the Jaffna hospital to visit an injured comrade where they were gunned down brutally. Later residents of Vadamaratchy staged a procession to protest the killing of Das. TELO gunmen shot at the people and dispersed the crowd after killing and injuring a few.

Nearly 400 TELO cadres from Vadamaratchy felt betrayed by their leadership. They approached the LTTE Jaffna commander Kittu and expressed a desire to join the LTTE. Kittu refused to take them saying the TELO discipline and training was not up to LTTE standards. Many of these TELO cadres left Jaffna for India and foreign countries. Some were killed by the Tigers when they launched an attack on the TELO in 1986 April.

When people remonstrated with the Tigers and said that they were foolish in not utilising the trained cadres and also for indulging in fratricidal warfare the LTTE arrogantly stated that they were strong enough to stand on their own. The Tigers would prevent Vadamaratchy falling into enemy hands at any cost the LTTE assured the Vadamaratchy residents. The LTTE also quickly filled the vacuum caused by the TELO decline and established themselves well in all parts of Vadamaratchy. So when Vadamaratchy fell the Tigers faced a crisis of confidence in the minds of the people. The LTTE had to do something quickly to salvage the situation.

It is against this backdrop that the LTTE planned to strike at the Army camp set up in the Nelliaddy Madhya Maha Vidyalayam premises. By this operation, the LTTE hoped to demonstrate two points. The first was to signal to Colombo and New Delhi that the LTTE though down was not out. The second point was to convey to the Tamil people that the Tigers were a fighting force still. 

Karaveddy

D-day for the Nelliaddy attack was 5 July 1987. The contours of the attack planned in Jaffna would be executed in Nelliaddy. After bidding farewell to Prabhakaran, Mahathaya and Kittu in Jaffna, the Tiger cadres designated for the attack like Kutti Praba, Miller, Razeek and others made their way to Karaveddi on the night of 4 July. 

The Sri Lankan army at that time was in control of Vadamaratchy areas up to Atchuvely. So the Tigers drove through side roads in Kopay, Neervely and Puthur to reach Karaveddy via Kappoothu. The two elf trucks were loaded with gelignite in the interior of Karaveddy bordering Nelliaddy. Kutti Praba was in charge of the explosives described in LTTE parlance as “Chakkai”. 

Two trucks

The first truck was to be driven by Miller while Razeek was to follow in the second. LTTE cadres were surprised at Miller’s calm attitude and serene mood as he too helped Kutti Praba in loading the explosives. Miller also helped connect the explosives and the exploder device. Fellow Tigers commented among themselves, “He is preparing his own coffin.”

Both vehicles were fitted with two devices to trigger off the explosion. One device would be within reach of the drivers Miller and Razeek. Each could set it off whenever they wanted to do so. The second device equipped at the back had a delayed timer. Once triggered it would explode in a matter of minutes. The timer device was to be set off minutes before the final ramming assault to doubly ensure success. The LTTE was not taking any chances. Even if the vehicle drivers were hit by enemy fire and incapacitated from triggering off the explosive mechanism the delayed timer would explode and do the needful. The front portion of the vehicles were steel plated to prevent bullets penetrating.

As H-hour approached the two vehicles with their explosive cargo started out. They were parked clandestinely behind a house in Nelliaddy itself in readiness for the deadly mission. Although the army was in control of Nelliaddy, it seldom ventured out of the camp vicinity after nightfall. So there was no danger of the vehicles being discovered. Also there was very little chance of the people informing the army about this.

Before 10 p.m.

The ideal time for the attack would have been midnight or the early hours of the morning. But in this case the Tigers had to complete the task before 10 p.m. The reason for this was that the soldiers were in the habit of leaving the Nelliaddy MMV camp in large numbers and sleeping in the surrounding houses. Only about 25% of the total strength would remain in the camp overnight.

Most houses in the vicinity of the camp had been vacated by the residents. So it was simple for the soldiers to move in there. This practice was followed because in those days the army preferred the comfort of houses for sleeping instead of the rigours of makeshift barracks. The fact that the Tigers could even conceive a plan to attack a camp of that magnitude was never taken into consideration.

As far as the Tigers were concerned they wanted to attack the camp with explosive laden vehicles before 10 o’clock so that the maximum number of soldiers as possible could be killed. They did not want the numerical strength of the camp to be reduced at the time of attack because of soldiers going elsewhere to sleep. The regular nocturnal habits of the soldiers had been discovered through reconnaissance missions (Rekke) conducted earlier by the LTTE. So the attack had to happen before 10 in the night.

The Nelliaddy attack began shortly after 9 p.m. on 5 July 1987. The Tiger cadres led by Capt. Kamal had a preliminary task. The roads leading to the camp had roadblocks and speed breakers. This was to prevent or slow down any possible attacks on vehicles. So Kamal and his group had to remove these impediments so that Miller and Razeek could drive their vehicles at full speed and ram into the camp buildings.

“Bangalore torpedoes”

The preliminary phase of the attack commenced with Tiger cadres demolishing these “obstacles” through the use of improvised explosive devices called “Bangalore torpedoes’’. These were long plastic pipes stuffed with explosives. The Tigers systematically removed the blocks with these Bangalore torpedoes under the protection of effective cover fire.

There was however a large roadblock constructed with trunks of Palmyra trees that proved hard to remove. Kamal then performed a feat usually seen in Western movies. While his comrades extended covering fire, Kamal picked up some explosives and went forward to the roadblock. He placed the explosives strategically and set it off. The roadblock was blown into oblivion. Kamal contacted Kutti Praba over the walkie-talkie and indicated in code that Miller could proceed towards the camp. 

Just when everything seemed clear for Miller to drive to the camp a new danger emerged. Soldiers with heavy artillery got into the well-fortified sentry point bunker overlooking the road. The soldiers began firing. Kamal signalled again to Kutti Praba and asked him to stop Miller until the new danger was cleared. An impatient Miller argued with Kutti Praba and said since the vehicle was armour plated in front it would be possible to drive on despite the soldiers firing. Kutti Praba overruled this and ordered him to wait.

Meanwhile Kamal ordered his men to fire rocket propelled grenades at the sentry bunker. The second launching scored a bull’s eye. The sentry bunker was shattered. The sandbags blew up into bits and caused a minor sand storm. Kamal now told Kutti Praba that the coast was clear for Miller to proceed.

Kutty Praba

Miller started his vehicle slowly. Kutty Praba went along with him. As the vehicle neared the Nelliaddy junction Kutty Praba jumped out and went to the back of the vehicle. He then set off the explosive device with the timer. Jogging along parallel to the Elf truck he made a final appeal to Miller – “No need for you to die. Go near the camp, trigger the explosives and jump off,” said Kutty Praba.

Kutty Praba later described Miller’s response to his request in a pro-LTTE journal. “Miller smiled slightly and turned to me from the driver’s seat and said the telecommunication exchange attack in Jaffna failed because our man jumped out of it too early. I will see this to the very end. Then Miller became tight lipped and pressed on the accelerator. I kept on trotting alongside but as the truck gained speed I fell behind. “This was the account of Kutti Praba about Miller’s frame of mind as he sped on to his tryst with destiny.

Kutti Praba then signalled to Razeek who was following Miller and repeated what he told Miller. He then set off the second explosive device and clambered aboard the pillion of a motorcycle and followed at some distance the explosive filled vehicles.

Last glimpse of Miller

Lt. Miller who was to be promoted post-humously as Capt. in a few days went on at full speed towards his target. Knowing that Miller was on his way, Kamal and his men retreated a hundred yards back from their original positions so as to escape the explosive fall-out. As Miller passed Kamal at high speed he waved his hand at him. That was the last glimpse of Miller. A few moments later he rammed into the Nelliaddy camp and set off the explosion that heralded the birth of the Black Tiger movement.

Razeek

Razeek followed suit. But when he reached the crater caused by Kamal’s blowing up the massive roadblock the truck front wheel fell into it. There was a sharp bump and then the vehicle wobbled dangerously and toppled. A frantic Razeek sitting at the wheel tried hard to steer it on course again but to no avail. He then jumped out and inspected it. Realising that he could not get it back on course he decided to run back before it exploded. Razeek’s truck exploded a few minutes after Miller’s truck blew up. But the second explosion was not effective at all in military terms.

Kamal and his men commenced their direct attack after the explosions. Exchanging gunfire they entered one side of the army camp. To their surprise they found that contrary to expectations the remaining soldiers at the Nelliaddy garrison had not been shocked into submission by the truck bomb. Instead they found that the soldiers had rallied and were putting up resistance. After a strenuous phase of fierce combat Kamal decided to call it a day.

“Major” Kamal

After returning to the temporary operational headquarters at a house at Mathoni in Nelliaddy some cadres suggested to Kamal that they go back to the military base and collect as many weapons as possible. Kamal concurred and set off to the spot again. The Tigers had just entered the camp again when a lone soldier hidden inside the water tank tower opened fire. Kamal the team commander fell dead. The remaining cadres withdrew taking Kamal’s body with them. Miller’s body blown into smithereens was nowhere to be seen. Capt. Kamal and Lt. Miller were promoted posthumously as Major and Captain respectively.

Exact figures about the Nelliaddy camp attack are yet a mystery. LTTE literature glorified the attack and stated that more than a hundred soldiers were killed and more than two hundred injured. The official figures released at that time minimised the casualty rates to the point of triviality. Despite the overestimation on one side and the underestimation on the other, the overall casualty rates combining both dead and injured exceeded a hundred easily. 

Nelliaddy not overrun

The LTTE did not overrun Nelliaddy as is widely believed. It was however the biggest victory achieved by the LTTE in its war with the Sri Lankan State up to that point of time. The next few days saw indisciplined sections of the army running amok in the Nelliaddy, Karaveddi, Thunnalai, Alvai areas killing civilians and looting houses.

The Nelliaddy Black Tiger attack enthused the Tigers with a new confidence. A few days later they overran the mini-garrison at Mayiladuthurai in the Valvettithurai area. Small groups of Tigers began infiltrating the Vadamaratchy area and began engaging the soldiers in skirmishes. The claim that Vadamaratchy had been liberated was challenged by the LTTE.

“Uyiraayutham” (live weapon)

More importantly the Nelliaddy attack had introduced the most deadly weapon in the LTTE arsenal “Uyiraayutham” or “live weapon”. Captain Miller was the pioneer of a long line of Black Tigers. LTTE supremo Prabhakaran later developed and streamlined the Black Tiger suicide squad into one of the world’s deadliest destructive forces.

The LTTE earned for itself a terrible reputation as the foremost exponents of suicide killer attacks surpassing those of the Japanese Kamikazes in World War Two or the Palestinian Hamas. The suicide killers are considered an elite unit within the LTTE called “Karumpuli”. It is translated literally in English as Black Tiger though the correct equivalent would be Panther.

Black Tiger attacks were of two kinds. One was against specific military targets like security installations, convoys, naval vessels, battle tanks, etc. Black Tigers were deployed during the heat of battle too. They drove explosive packed vehicles or vessels on to enemy targets. Those who die in such attempts were formally acknowledged and praised as “Maaveerar” or great heroes. 

The other form of attacks were of a terroristic nature. These were against controversial civilian targets. These attacks resulting in civilian deaths earned global opprobrium for the LTTE. The LTTE was unable to honour these Black Tigers openly because of the negative publicity involved. So they were honoured privately and anonymously as unknown heroes.

Black Tigers comprised volunteers only. After selection by drawing lots they were given special training. Then each Black Tiger was granted an exclusive audience with the LTTE leader Veluppillai Prabhakaran. The Tiger supremo shared a meal with the young cadre about to embark on a suicide mission. After the Black Tiger’s mission was accomplished, photographs of the last supper with Prabhakaran were published in LTTE journals.

“Thatkodai” (self-sacrifice)

The destructive capacity of the highly motivated Black Tigers or suicide killers has contributed to a qualitative difference in the conduct of the war. The question that puzzles Government forces as well as all observers of the conflict was what made the LTTE suicide killer tick? Though the Tiger cadres were Hindu or Christian, the LTTE was politically secular. There was no religious fanaticism but only nationalistic fervour here. The ideal of a separate country for the Tamils along with the perception that one is engaged in “Thatkodai” or self-sacrifice for that goal seem to have been be motivating factors. 

(The writer can be reached at [email protected].)