Politicisation of Foreign Service: Multidimensional and systemic challenge

Much of what is sought to be achieved on the foreign relations front would depend on who the ‘right persons’ are to be entrusted with the responsibility of representing Sri Lanka. This is not about missions only, it is also about what should have been the diplomatic powerhouse of Sri Lanka – the Foreign Ministry. I mean the collective, not one individual. It would do well to consider merit alongside probity, astuteness, temperament, maturity and resilience as among criteria for appointment of right persons. These are missing attributes in the Foreign Service nowadays, temperament undoubtedly topping the list. What is denoted by ‘right’ here is the right mix, and not being politically on the right side. The latter of course was the cause of many diplomatic misadventures in the recent past

 

With AKD and his Government in the saddle, there are signs now that the foreign policy thrust is likely to shift from its one-time, confrontational proclivity to a cooperative engagement. For a country that lies at the intersection of regional strategic centres and is itself in a strategic location, mutual cooperation can be an added strength, not a drawback. Cooperation with other countries and entities can be the norm and proceed apace while the country stands its ground firmly when it comes to its vital interests. It can do so without conflating them with RW’s free-for-all type or Gota’s rhetorical strategic interest type

 

As politicisation would do to any professional service in the public sector, the politicisation of Foreign Service impacts appointments, decisions, and actions within a country’s Foreign Service. It is political considerations that influence them rather than professional competence, merit, or diplomatic expertise. That’s how over the years it has grown to be a systemic issue

President Anura Kumara Dissanayake has directed that all political appointees to the diplomatic service be recalled. The political appointees are expected to complete their assignments before 1 December 2024. 

The President and his Government apparently do not want to take any chance with political appointees of former governments. Anyone who survives the recall and remains at post would undoubtedly have astounding political sophistry!

However, one must note that politicisation is not political appointments alone. It’s a multidimensional issue. Politicisation undermines the efficacy of a nation’s diplomatic service, its legitimacy, and objectivity by elevating political allegiance above the knowledge and experience required for fruitful international relations. In Sri Lanka’s case, it has become a systemic issue over the years. 

With AKD and his Government in the saddle, there are signs now that the foreign policy thrust is likely to shift from its one-time, confrontational proclivity to a cooperative engagement. For a country that lies at the intersection of regional strategic centres and is itself in a strategic location, mutual cooperation can be an added strength, not a drawback. Cooperation with other countries and entities can be the norm and proceed apace while the country stands its ground firmly when it comes to its vital interests. It can do so without conflating them with RW’s free-for-all type or Gota’s rhetorical strategic interest type. 

Coherent and effective messaging

Such policy thrust, however, requires coherent and effective messaging. Clear, unambiguous, near-real-time communication with different capitals and interlocutors is a must. Communication is however a two-way channel, and there is no scope in it for megaphone diplomacy or grand-standing, so to say. I am not talking about big powers or Trump World – II here. 

That said, much of what is sought to be achieved on the foreign relations front would depend on who the ‘right persons’ are to be entrusted with the responsibility of representing Sri Lanka. This is not about missions only, it is also about what should have been the diplomatic powerhouse of Sri Lanka – the Foreign Ministry. I mean the collective, not one individual. It would do well to consider merit alongside probity, astuteness, temperament, maturity and resilience as among criteria for appointment of right persons. These are missing attributes in the Foreign Service nowadays, temperament undoubtedly topping the list. What is denoted by ‘right’ here is the right mix, and not being politically on the right side. The latter of course was the cause of many diplomatic misadventures in the recent past. 

In the meantime, one cannot brush aside the fact that this nation is not yet out of the woods following the economic crisis of 2022. While in conventional diplomacy being economical with fact is usually not resented, it is not so for a crisis-ridden country that is not economical with resources, especially scarce financial resources. The question arises therefore, as to whether Sri Lanka missions abroad should have the same number of diplomats and others as are recalled, when replacements are decided. 

Rightsize the staff

An idea perhaps is to rightsize the staff of each diplomatic mission of Sri Lanka abroad. This can be done both as a cost-cutting measure and as an efficiency-enhancing effort. For instance, in our missions where both the Ambassador and the person holding no. 2 or no. 3 positions are political appointees, it is possible that appointments would be made to the posts of Ambassador, to begin with. The actual number of replacements needed could thus be considerably brought down, relieving pressure on foreign exchange.

There is widespread criticism that the two immediate past presidents and their governments stuffed Sri Lanka missions abroad with more political appointees than required by the approved cadre. Many of those thus appointed hold varying diplomatic ranks, and others occupy non-diplomatic positions. Even BIMSTEC was not spared. This is especially the case in English speaking countries as well as in other developed countries like France, Sweden, Austria, Germany, Netherlands, to name but a few. It is perhaps the fastest pace of politicisation in the shortest possible time (just over two years) that Sri Lanka has ever experienced. 

The question now coming up before decision-makers is this: Are there enough officers at a reasonably senior level in the SLFS who could be appointed to senior diplomatic positions. The short answer is Yes. But then, are they all adequately trained and experienced? Yes and No.

A serious blow to professionalism in the service came from political appointments, especially since the end of the armed conflict in 2009. But it had accelerated since the advent of the MR presidency in 2005. This has brought discredit to the country, not pride. But an equally serious blow to the professional service happened within the Foreign Service itself. 

When politicisation intensified, the Foreign Service saw little incentive in upgrading its skills, primarily because its places were taken by outsiders. There were instances when outsiders dropped in at the Ministry to inquire as to in which country diplomatic and other vacancies were coming up and what positions they were. Further, some officers did political biddings and excelled in the art of ‘proximity to power.’ They were rewarded with postings quicker and better than the hard-working and competent lot deserved. The process of politicisation from within the service steadily gained ground thus encouraging professional incompetence in several of our missions abroad, and to some extent in the Ministry as well. 

No training program 

On the other hand, there were no adequate, predictable and diverse opportunities made available to the Foreign Service officers for training and specialisation, whether in Sri Lanka or abroad. The Bandaranaike International Diplomatic Training Institute could measure up to the task, but it is shackled to the management of Lakshman Kadirgamar Institute. As far as external training was concerned, Australia provided long term scholarships which benefited some, and short term opportunities were offered by a few other countries from time to time. However, no training program had a specific component of practical exposure beyond theory learning and field visits. 

A pertinent question begs an answer. Which state or foreign institution would want to offer long term opportunities for training to a foreign service which risks being politicised? Wouldn’t it be a waste of funds on their part to provide such training when it is obvious that the exposure received would not be made use of by the recipient? Put it differently, the phenomenon of political appointment deprived Foreign Service officers of any chance of applying the knowledge and skills gained through such training, in the service of diplomacy. 

The damage that external and internal politicisation has caused to the Foreign Service is unimaginable. Take for example officer “Y” who dropped in at my office seeking some help during the COVID-19 period. I was Additional Secretary for East in the Foreign Ministry then. The Secretary had called the officer on the phone earlier that day and asked for a report on a matter that he considered was urgent. It was the time when, due to COVID-19 pandemic, work-from-home arrangements were in place. The officer who originally handled the subject in the same division didn’t turn up for work for a few days in spite of the agreed schedule, and hence this person. Interestingly it was not a division that came under my watch.

The officer handed me a draft report and wanted me to see if it was in order. It appeared to me that the draft required some revisions though it contained all the relevant facts (which was good of an officer whose subject it was not). A deeper analysis and logical sequencing was lacking, though. So I helped revise the draft and requested the officer to add a concluding paragraph providing specific recommendations to the Secretary. 

During the conversation it transpired that the officer was in service for around 15 years and worked in three different Sri Lanka missions overseas. The person slowly opened up, and it was a professional ordeal.

“In all three missions my bosses were political appointees except for a brief period under a career head of mission. I never had the benefit of professional nurturing.” The officer then added, “Back in the ministry I receive calls from the Secretary’s office asking to prepare official notes and reports for him, but I have no guidance here as well, and the Secretary too is a political appointee.”

The story didn’t end there. It continued on another day months later. This time around, it was about that officer’s transfer to another mission. The officer’s first preference for transfer made out in the application to the Ministry was coincidentally the same mission that the other officer in the same division (who was absent during the COVID-19 pandemic) marked as the first preference as well. The other officer’s previous three postings were in missions headed by career ambassadors. Now in the latest round of transfers, both were vying for a station which was headed by a career ambassador. Of course there were other applicants, too. 

Internal and external politics

Obviously internal and external politics played a role in the matter, but no responsible seniors overseeing transfers would have the heart to tell this person that the first preference would not be granted. They were however ‘politically’ ingenious. They summoned the officer to discuss the matter, and suggesting a different mission for transfer, told the officer “You are a very capable person who has the experience of ‘managing’ political heads of mission, and no one else has your experience. What we offer you now is an “A” grade station. Please take it and get ready to leave next month.”

Whether or not the officer accepted it is not important. But how politics, internal and external, conspired to deny officers the professional grounding, much needed to best serve the country is perplexing. 

All it makes clear is that politicisation of the Foreign Service is a multidimensional challenge. Yes, it started with a lopsided process of political appointment. As politicisation would do to any professional service in the public sector, the politicisation of Foreign Service impacts appointments, decisions, and actions within a country’s Foreign Service. It is political considerations that influence them rather than professional competence, merit, or diplomatic expertise. That’s how over the years it has grown to be a systemic issue. 

The AKD Government needs to consider some practical measures to address the question of professionalisation of the Foreign Service. 

First, it needs to do a quick diagnostic of the challenges faced by the country in the external theatre as well as human resource and other constraints that impede the efficacy of the diplomatic apparatus in achieving best outcomes for the country (In diplomacy, best outcomes are ‘negotiated’ outcomes by definition, and hence the importance of knowing the negotiating contexts in addition to possessing negotiation skills). 

Second, it is important to ensure that there is ‘rightsizing’ of the diplomatic cadre as well as other staff in each mission and that there are regular recruitments to the Foreign Service (say, every two years). There needs to be a complete map-out of professional cadre requirements in the Ministry, and the strengthening of the professional core with clearly delineated work areas and KPIs. It is perhaps only in Sri Lanka that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs calls applications for the recruitment of “X” number of foreign service officers after almost a 5 year gap, holds an open competitive examination and a rigorous interview, and then arbitrarily reduces the number by half when all processes have been completed. Those who were excluded are mostly from areas far from Colombo. 

Third, there needs to be absolute clarity as to whether in a ‘system-changed’ environment, there would still be any role for appointees other than from the Foreign Service, and if yes, the minimum percentage to be allocated for that category to be deployed on short term assignments. Also, what kinds of qualifications, knowledge and experience, skills, prior-professional service, and special merits are required. 

Fourth, there should be a series of quick-impact capacity building and skills upgradation programmes for the existing professional and other cadres. For new recruits, there should be a minimum two year training, ideally in a foreign institution, with a part of the period earmarked for internal attachment (Some Commonwealth countries provide such opportunities). 

Fifth, there should be a series of region-based, or Sri Lanka-based stock-taking and brain-storming sessions between and among Sri Lanka’s diplomats and policy makers to ‘review and renew’ goals set and KPIs followed. A specific session may be devoted to analysing global and regional strategic landscapes and Sri Lanka’s place in them, with a clear focus on maximisation of economic advantages for the country in all their aspects. 

Sixth, a system of evaluation of the performance of the entire diplomatic apparatus may be put in place that may report to Parliament every year, and this is different from reporting before or during budget debates.

These are among ideas that may be suggested, but it is not an exhaustive list. It is possible, however, that already there are some broad proposals within the AKD Government that may be under active consideration. 

(The writer can be contacted via email: [email protected].)