Trapezing with defence cooperation

India is the Big Brother, then, and now

If an Indian proposal supportive of oceanographic involvement by Indians is agreed upon by Sri Lanka, the Chinese interests will be erased and could create other pressures. If such an Indian proposal is refused by Sri Lanka it would enrage India, and similar difficult pressures could arise, as with the Chinese. Sri Lanka must specialise in trapeze acts

Hindustan Times (29 March 2025) carried a news item regarding a ‘defense cooperation framework’ (details unknown in our public domain), to be signed, when PM Narendra Modi is in Colombo, presumably, a carry-over of the Joint Statement (JS) published after President Anura Kumara Disanayake visited India.

Then I hear of our Opposition politicians grumbling that the ‘Framework’ is not tabled in Parliament, not published for public knowledge, not discussed adequately, when it could be detrimental to sovereignty. They surprised us since they never protested the JR-Rajiv Accord, Ranil-Prabhakaran Ceasefire Agreement, or President Jayewardene inviting the Indian Peacekeeping Forces, the very day the Accord was signed, contents unknown to the public or Parliament; or sometimes even the Cabinet!

That said, having had personal experiences of failures with the military in implementing the Ceasefire Agreement, I agree that such frameworks should be implemented with the full knowledge of internal stakeholders, especially the military. Agreeing to a Ceasefire Draft prepared by Norwegians, and not sharing it with the then military hierarchy for good or bad reasons, was an experience not to repeat.

Anyhow, when one delves into defence cooperation between countries, the initial query is, “Is the country faced with a defence threat?” Between India and Sri Lanka, such conflicting status is normally non-existent, and all our Presidents have also assured the safety of India.

There were contradicting complaints made by us decades back against Indians for ‘sheltering’ the LTTE terrorists, the Indian Research and Analysis Wing training them and arming them, which were denied by Indian authorities. Tamil Nadu’s Chief Minister M.K. Stalin resolved this week, that the only permanent solution for the fisher problem in Palk Bay is to “retrieve Katchatheevu.” It coincided with PM Modi’s visit to Colombo and could be considered another, from the Indian end. In politics such could happen as bargaining chips for a totally unconnected issue. Let’s trapeze!

Indian experience in defence cooperation

India has come into defence frameworks with several neighbours.

India and Myanmar have signed an MoU on bilateral defence cooperation, slating to deepen military-to-military ties in the areas of training, maritime security, military supplies, and joint surveillance.

India and Nepal have a long history of military cooperation, including joint exercises, training exchanges, and the recruitment of Gurkhas into the Indian Army, with the 1947-Tripartite Agreement playing a key role in shaping these ties. Recently there have been minor skirmishes in the Kalapani area, but serious conflict cannot be foreseen, though empty threats were made by Nepalese PM Oli sometime back.

Bhutan and India have agreed not to allow their territory to be used for activities harmful to the national security and interest of the other. India allows Bhutan the free import of defence material, from or through India as required, upon India being satisfied that the Bhutanese intentions are friendly and there is no danger to India.

India has reaffirmed its commitment to enhancing the Maldivian defence capabilities by providing defence equipment and platforms, reflecting India’s positive “Neighborhood First” Policy and strengthening bilateral security and defence cooperation between the two nations. India supports Maldivian military infrastructure development, training, and military institutional building, and has handed over a coastal radar system, comprising 10 radar stations, built with a $ 15.8 million, Indian grant.

Former Bangladesh PM Sheikh Hasina has signed defence cooperation agreements with India. The Bangladesh Navy signed a deal with India’s state-run engineering organisation for an 800-ton oceangoing tug, financed by a $ 500 million line of credit India provided for defence purchases. India has settled a longstanding border dispute too. However, in Bangladesh, such cooperation and other agreements reached in other spheres were disliked by the people, which finally ousted PM Hasina.

So, why not India suggest a Defence Cooperation Agreement with Sri Lanka?

Past Sri Lanka-India defence status scenarios

Defence relations with India are guided by identified restrictions. As Avatar Singh Bhasin explained, “There could be no running away from the fact that small states in the region fell in India’s security perimeter and therefore must not follow policies that would impinge on her security concerns in the area. They should not seek to invite outside power(s). If any one of them needed any assistance it should look to India. India’s attitude and relationship with her immediate neighbours depended on their appreciation of India’s regional security concerns; they would serve as buffer states in the event of an extra-regional threat and not proxies of the outside powers.”

India is the Big Brother, then, and now. This was the Indian policy.

Indians are concerned about Chinese or Pakistanis having close relations with any neighbour, whether giving aid, assistance, grants, projects, you name. For example, even internally, Indians are quite rightly concerned with Kashmiris having relations with Pakistan-based terror groups, Chinese supporting Pakistan, the Maldives or Sri Lanka, and anyone reinforcing the “String of Pearls” or Belt and Road Initiatives. Let’s agree, that all these make India justifiably vulnerable.

About us, the history speaks more. The British Cabinet delegation, which represented London at the independence celebration in Ceylon (1948) noted in its report to the British Government that PM D.S. Senanayake told the delegation “that he regarded the Indian problem as one of the two dangers facing Ceylon,” the other being the Communists. This justified Senanayake to “a close military tie-up” with the British. Such thinking could be archaic now, with enhanced mutual friendly relations with India. Hence, why a new defence framework? Is it due to brewing suspicion or pre-planning other motives or any regional strategy initiated by other superpowers or attempting to cash in on other economic obligations of Sri Lanka to India?

In that light, it is remembered that in 2023 US State Department official Victoria Nuland proposed to the Sri Lankan Government to establish a US-Indian Joint Military Base in Trincomalee, which was then opposed by the JVP and the Opposition. Nuland met Minister Jaishankar in Delhi while this was being proposed, and would receive Indian agreement.

The Indian and American interests to corner China is their regional and Indian Oceanic priority, and Nuland’s proposal was one step forward. Hence, a defence framework must be cautious, not to tag to any manipulatory bandwagon, irking China, while managing India. One must learn the ways and means by reading Minister Jaishankar’s “Why Bharat Matters?” Of course, Jaishankars, Dovals, Samantha Goels, and Nulands are rare species! This proposal was not meant to serve Sri Lankan defence interests, but for a region-specific strategic defence plan of action, for which Sri Lanka is ill-equipped to partner. It could be to pulverise Sri Lanka’s existing good relations with China.

Reverting to the past, different approaches were noted leading to defence cooperation. For instance, PM Sirimavo Bandaranaike received Indian military assistance to crush the JVP insurgency in 1971. Much to the displeasure of Indians, she stood with West Pakistan permitting Pakistani Air Force planes to refuel on the way to Dacca.

President J.R. Jayewardene approached PM Rajiv Gandhi for military assistance in Bangalore at the end of 1986 to crush the LTTE in the North and East and the JVP in the South. In July 1987, Jayewardene signed the Indo-Lanka Accord and invited the Indian Peace Keeping Forces the same day, to tame the terrorists, which ended with President R Premadasa relieving them, calling a foreign force in a country meant violation of its sovereignty.

Another attempt at defence cooperation was in 2003 when PM Ranil Wickremesinghe agreed to work on a framework for defence cooperation with Indians but did not pursue it. And now we have President Dissanayake planning a defence framework. Perhaps, PM Wickremesinghe might have tried, to send a message to the LTTE.

Therefore, seeking defence cooperation from India is nothing novel to Sri Lanka.

Irrespective of special defence frameworks, the two countries had close military relations with military leaders visiting each other, conducting military drills, thousands in all being trained in India, sharing intelligence that was extraordinarily helpful during the LTTE conflict, and providing non-lethal material (due to the Tamil Nadu factor), support at international fora, etc. Some of these actions (i.e. training, drills) are common features in military cooperation with other countries mentioned earlier, as well, and some of them supported Sri Lanka by selling lethal war material to fight the terrorists. Like with any country, there had been differences with India too on the reconciliation process, queries being made on the Chinese submarines, oceanographic research vessels, fishermen’s safety, etc.

Indian institutional support to the neighbourhood

India’s “Neighborhood First” concept and the Security and Growth for All in the Region (SAGAR) are always quoted as Indian neighbourly support. SAGAR is a project highlighting India’s importance in the Indian Ocean Region, sealing India’s ‘first responder’ and “dependent strategic partner,” status, best projected during the COVID-19 times.

According to Minister Jaishankar’s book ‘The India Way’, the key elements of SAGAR focus on safeguarding the Indian mainland and islands, defending their interests, securing a stable Indian Ocean, speaks of economic and security cooperation, capacity development to advance peace, security and emergency responses. In performing these tasks, SAGAR plus QUAD counter China’s aggressive regional presence, its ‘String of Pearls’ doctrine, which threatens Indian and US defence and security involvements.

The latest concept launched by PM Modi on 12 March 2025 is ‘Mutual and Holistic Advancement for Security and Growth Across Regions’, (MAHASAGAR) which is an elevation of ties of SAGAR. Reverberating its objectives, PM Modi said, “We are committed to extend full cooperation in the security of Mauritius’s Exclusive Economic Zone”, which could be reiterated in Colombo as “We are committed to extend full cooperation in the security of Sri Lanka’s Exclusive Economic Zone.” Be ready for smart trapezing, if PM Modi magically bowls this doosra, bowling out the Chinese!

International expert Viraj Solanki (International Institute for Strategic Studies) says: “China really is India’s long-term strategic challenge, both on the border and in the Indian Ocean as well” and projected: “This has resulted in a number of defence partnerships by India shifting, or just focusing on countering China’s growing influence in the Indo-Pacific region.” Just mind the words “defence partnerships by India!”

He quoted the “most recent partnership enhancements began in Sri Lanka, where the Maritime Rescue Coordinating Center, backed by an Indian $ 6 million grant, opened in June 2024” and expressed its capacity to track shipping across vast areas with SriLankan Navy involvement and the seven remote stations, one located near Chinese managed Hambantota Port.

Such tracking would be more beneficial to Indians than us, not facing maritime threats. Indian interest is quite logical and justified. No wonder Minister Jaishankar after opening the facility quipped, that “Colombo was a key part of India’s regional relations and maritime security policies.” Do we hear correctly, “Whose maritime security policies?”

From our experiences with defence sector cooperation with India and China, and Indian interventions in the neighbourhood, a normal defence agreement need not be looked at as negative or dangerous. However, there are continuing serious involvements like berthing submarines, oceanography research, Extended Economic Zone boundaries, seabed resources exploration, etc. where conflicts of interest emerge and such adversarial approaches of giants must be settled by appropriate dialogue between parties and if required by international engagement

Chinese interests versus Indian interests

We are aware of conflicts between Indians and the Chinese. Due to this competition smaller nations and economies sustain harassment. The 2024- Indo-Lanka JS, Item 25 quotes engaging in hydrography which focuses on measuring and mapping the physical features of water bodies, primarily for navigation and safety. The competition and complaints heard for years were against the Chinese oceanography research vessels equipped for intelligence gathering, according to Indians. Oceanography is a broader scientific discipline that studies all aspects of the ocean, including its physical, chemical, biological, and geological characteristics. It was not in the JS, and if included in the present agreement, it sounds somewhat special.

This interpretation explains why the Chinese compete to obtain permission for scientific exploration through oceanography, and why Indians protest. Probably our Government’s indecisiveness, and potential to bend towards China, it can be predicted that the Indians would claim somehow to lead to oceanography, by including it in the present Defence Cooperation Agreement. Mentioning hydrography in the JS may be a dummy!

If an Indian proposal supportive of oceanographic involvement by Indians is agreed upon by Sri Lanka, the Chinese interests will be erased and could create other pressures. If such an Indian proposal is refused by Sri Lanka it would enrage India, and similar difficult pressures could arise, as with the Chinese. Sri Lanka must specialise in trapeze acts!

Concurrently our application to the International Seabed Authority for exploration has been lying indecisively since 2009, while Indians have made a counterclaim for exploration in 2024, in AN Seamount, which is out of its jurisdiction, most likely envisaging the possibility of Sri Lanka cooperating with China for exploration, creating maritime security issues for India. If Sri Lanka could find a via media not to upset both giants, it could be the way to settle this diplomatic, economic, and political issue. We cannot run away. Trapeze again!

Unfortunately, oceanographic research is expensive and technologically advanced and Sri Lanka is not thus equipped to handle it. Both Indians and the Chinese are competing not only for national pride or maritime security, but for the cobalt, manganese, nickel, and copper resources allegedly available in the Afanasy Nitikin Seamount crust.

A long shot to solve this issue is to approach the Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission (IOC) of UNESCO which is a UN agency identified as competent in the field of marine scientific research, including oceanographic surveys of seabeds, leading to the UN Decade of Ocean Science for Sustainable Development. I am no expert to suggest, but in my mind, it is worth studying. Let Minister Vijitha Herath, the amiable nominee High Commissioner Maheshini Colonne, an expert on the UN activities, and Defense and Foreign Ministry Secretaries AVM(R) Thuiyakontha and Aruni Ranaraja, find a plausible way out to any contradicting or conflicting defense situations.

Conclusion

From our experiences with defence sector cooperation with India and China, and Indian interventions in the neighbourhood, a normal defence agreement need not be looked at as negative or dangerous. However, there are continuing serious involvements like berthing submarines, oceanography research, Extended Economic Zone boundaries, seabed resources exploration, etc. where conflicts of interest emerge and such adversarial approaches of giants must be settled by appropriate dialogue between parties and if required by international engagement.

We wish the proposed agreement had avoided such eventualities. If such is incorporated as of now in the draft, the best could be to agree to initiate wider dialogue with internationals, rather than to cause political embarrassments to everyone and place normal defence involvements intact, as they had been. Any agreement reached must be followed up with operational mechanisms and it would open space for reasonable and logical adjustments to the agreed issues. Hence, the time has not run out as yet, and let’s avoid the acute angles and proceed.