“Cocoon” around heads of state: Is there one around President Anura Dissanayake already?

It is necessary to break this cocoon by appointing a council of economic advisers. The council must listen to the alternative perspectives specially based on research, empirical analysis and data. Then council members are required to submit an individual report in writing to the President based on which the President would have an enlightened discourse on the subject. The same principle of Continuous Improvement Process can be applied here by stopping the prevention of the flow of information to the top

By Hema Senanayake

The “cocoon” around heads of state refers to the insulating layer of advisors, staff, and bureaucrats who control access to the leader, sometimes filtering or distorting the flow of information. This phenomenon can prevent heads of state from receiving accurate, unfiltered information and limit their exposure to diverse perspectives. This is especially true when it comes to economic governance, the most crucial part of governance. 

As far back as 2020, an economist who saw the impending balance of payment crisis was requested by none other than the brother-in-law of President Gotabaya, Dr. Lalith Chandradasa to write a brief letter to the President assuring that the President would receive the letter personally. It happened as Lalith promised. As usual the President put a minute on the latter and submitted to the President’s Secretary Dr. P.B. Jayasundera. The minute says, “Study and report.” Dr. P.B. being himself an economist and a former treasury secretary, killed the proposal without giving any hearing to the proponent by the President. In addition, many concerned individuals tried to enlighten the President on this matter, but all were ignored. P.B’s thinking was that the Government could manage the balance of payment problems by “fast tracking” (expediting) the already approved projects by the World Bank, ADB and JICA, etc. According to him all other perspectives were nonsense. It was a one-man cocoon spun around President Gotabaya and the President failed big time. 

The impact of inner power circles who block the flow of information to the President blurs the vision of the President. It happened to all presidents of Sri Lanka, one concerned professor says. 

R. Premadasa – Paskaralingam

Chandrika Kumaratunga – A.S. Jayawardena and P.B. Jayasundera

Mahinda Rajapaksa – P.B. Jayasundera and Ajith Cabraal

Maithripala Sirisena – Ranil Wickremesinghe and his Royal College clan

Gotabaya Rajapaksa – P.B. Jayasundera and Ajith Cabraal

Ranil Wickremesinghe – himself

Anura Kumara Dissanayake – too early to comment but it seems over relying on university academics and University of Kelaniya clan. 

It is necessary to break this cocoon by appointing a council of economic advisers. The council must listen to the alternative perspectives specially based on research, empirical analysis and data. Then council members are required to submit an individual report in writing to the President based on which the President would have an enlightened discourse on the subject. The same principle of Continuous Improvement Process can be applied here by stopping the prevention of the flow of information to the top.

Here are some ways this “cocoon” can inhibit the free flow of information:

1. Gatekeeping by advisors:

Advisors or close aides often control what information reaches the head of state. They may prioritise certain information or present it in a biased way, filtering out dissenting voices, negative feedback, or inconvenient facts. This gatekeeping can create a skewed view of reality for the leader.

Usually, in environments where power is centralised and criticism or alternative perspectives are not well-received, subordinates may fear delivering bad news or voicing dissenting opinions. This can result in self-censorship, where only favourable information is presented, insulating the head of state from important challenges or emerging problems. Isn’t this what happened to Gotabaya?

2. Bureaucratic layers:

In government structures, multiple layers of bureaucracy can distort or delay the transmission of information. By the time it reaches the head of state, key details may have been altered, downplayed, or lost altogether. 

3. Over-reliance on a small circle:

When leaders rely too heavily on a small inner circle of advisors, they may receive a limited range of viewpoints. These close confidants may have personal or political interests in controlling the narrative or protecting their influence, further limiting the diversity of information. This is why advisors are required to submit individual reports in writing on alternatives. 

4. Information overload:

Heads of state are often bombarded with vast amounts of information. To manage this, their staff filter and summarise the data. While necessary, this process can lead to oversimplification or omission of critical details, causing leaders to miss important nuances.

5. Echo chambers:

An echo chamber is an environment where a person only encounters information or opinions that reflect and reinforce his own. This is like the sound is repeated in echoing. Leaders surrounded by like-minded individuals can fall into echo chambers, where the same ideas and beliefs are reinforced while very rational alternative perspectives are ignored. This can create a false sense of consensus and prevent the leader from considering other, potentially better, solutions. For example, NPP supporters strongly believe that preventing corruption and waste can save enough money to run the government. This is not true even though corruption and waste must be stopped. But dissenting voices of concerned economists and analysts are suppressed or are made ignored by echoing voices of prior belief. This is the case with price controls. Many politicians prefer administrative prices. 

6. Manipulation for political gain:

In some cases, advisors or officials may deliberately manipulate information to advance their own political agendas or personal interests. By shaping the narrative, they can influence the decisions of the head of state in their favour. Usually, advisors like to behave and work in their comfort zones as they do not want the head of state to know that some other people know the particular subject better than themselves. As a result, an environmental economist would act as macroeconomist, or an accountant can perform as a central banker. In recent history, one stock market broker became the central bank governor in Sri Lanka. Then the Prime Minister wanted to remove the private placement in issuing bonds under the premise of issuing bonds only by public auctions. The governor meekly agreed. It was a bad decision and within a few months that decision was revoked. The infamous bond scandal took place under this governorship. 

Consequences of the “cocoon” effect:

• Poor decision-making: Without access to accurate, diverse, and timely information, leaders may make poorly informed decisions that don’t reflect the realities on the ground.
• Delayed responses: Critical issues, such as economic crises, public unrest, or security threats, may not reach the leader quickly enough, delaying appropriate responses.
• Detachment from public sentiment: Leaders insulated by a cocoon may lose touch with the needs and concerns of the general population, leading to policies that are disconnected from public sentiment.
• Groupthink: When diverse perspectives are filtered out, groupthink can occur, where the decision-making process lacks critical debate and scrutiny. 

To combat this, heads of state can encourage open communication, seek multiple sources of information, and ensure their advisors foster an environment where transparency and accountability are prioritised. Get them to prepare notes in writing on actionable advice. 

(The writer can be reached at [email protected].)