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Tuesday, 10 March 2015 00:05 - - {{hitsCtrl.values.hits}}
He then went on to illustrate the Sri Lankan Army’s capabilities while highlighting the challenges it faced throughout the war in areas including logistics, recruitment and battle strategy. He also went over the chronological events of Eelam Wars I to IV, shedding light on military strategy and the various shortcomings of the Army over the years.
He explained that when he took over the Army, he realised that the aim needed to be shifted from capturing ground from the enemy to destroying them completely.
“In my case I knew that if we destroyed the terrorists, it would leave room for the ground to fall into our hands. I always gave priority to destroying the terrorists and capturing the ground automatically became a reality,” he stated.
He claimed that this change in objective did not always coincide with the aspirations of the politicians in Colombo as the fighting would sometimes drag on for extended periods of time. He stated that the Commander-in-Chief at the time and his “famous brother” were constantly communicating their impatience to him, but that he stood firmly focussed on not just capturing the ground but thinning down the LTTE forces.
The General pointed out that when he took over the Army, its strength was around 116,000. Although the approved capacity was at 132,000, the Army was unable to fill the vacancies. However, it would go on to add another 84,000 to its numbers by the time the war ended. General Fonseka said that the LTTE’s strength grew parallel to that of the Sri Lankan Army as it started off with just 15 recruits and had as many as 35,000 in its ranks at the height of its strength.
Drawing attention to the former Government’s acceptance of former LTTE leaders such as Pillayan and Karuna, he said: “When I handed over duties, there were zero LTTE cadres left. Actually, there were four but they were being protected by the head of the country at the time,” he said.
The LTTE had four major victories, according to the General: The 1991 attack on a battalion at Elephant Pass, the 1996 attack on a brigade in Mullaitivu where they wiped out around 1,500 soldiers, the 1999 attack on a brigade in Kilinochchi, and the 1999 attack on four divisions of troops stationed between Vavuniya and Mankulam. The final attack took the LTTE two weeks to complete whereas the Army took nearly two years to recapture area that was lost during that time. In 2000, the LTTE overran a two-division base at Elephant Pass, which was to be the last time they overran an Army camp.
“Army morale was very low at the time. We were on the run and the LTTE was performing very well and sending shockwaves through the country,” he said.
The General briefly described the LTTE’s weaponry and its capabilities on water as well as in the air, claiming that the terrorist group was able to meet the Army blow for blow and had the strength to carry out brutal attacks as well as infiltrate Government-held areas with ease.
“One place you have to give credit to the LTTE cadres is that they fought to the last man and the last bullet. They were so motivated and did not believe in running back. Of course they couldn’t run back because they would have been shot by their leaders,” he said.
He also stated that he believed that the Army and Police Intelligence Units were nowhere near as effective as LTTE Intelligence, giving several examples of how easily the terrorists were able to infiltrate Government institutions as well as the staff of prominent figures.
Preparations before the war
General Sarath Fonseka took over the Army in 2006 but he was preparing for the inevitable final confrontation with the LTTE far before that. In 2002 he was the Jaffna Commander but stated that he realised at that point there was no one senior to him who had the capability to take over the Army if the country went back into war.
He said that despite various promises of peace being made by the President at the time through his ‘Mahinda Chinthana’ manifesto, he knew that they would fail and the war would resume.
“I started training and preparing strategies. Firstly I started preparing the defences in the north. I had to be ready for a prolonged war. I had to challenge the norms of military strategy,” he said.
A change in formation and a deviation from the practiced norms of the Sri Lankan Army was one of the first things the General concentrated on. He claimed that the military suffered heavy losses because they proceeded in narrow lines predominantly using the main roads because the forces were more focused on logistical support.
“We realised we had to advance in very wide fronts, as much as 15-20km in width, in order to disperse the terrorist manpower and firepower.”
This allowed the military to engage the enemy in a wider area, which meant that the enemy lines would thin significantly. With the superior numbers of the Sri Lankan Army, this strategy greatly improved its capacity to recapture areas. This also meant the Commander was able to deploy his divisions in several areas at once instead of focussing all his strength in one area.
Weekly visits to key areas of the battlefield also allowed the General to stay informed about the ground situations in all the areas.
Fighting the war on multiple fronts
The General also realised that he needed to fight the northern battle against the LTTE on four fronts, which he identified as Vavuniya, Mannar, Weli Oya and Muhumalai. Hence, following the recapturing of the east, the enemy found it difficult to manage the war on multiple fronts.
“We also fought with four-man teams who were trained to operate deep in the jungle. They were trained to be self-reliant and operate independently. So a battalion had large numbers of four-man groups that allowed us to operate from wider fronts,” he explained.
These special units were trained to cook their own food, carry around 100 pounds on their backs, carry an injured soldier as well as communicate with other units. They were also able to request artillery fire or air support whenever needed.
Defying the famous advice of Chinese General and military strategist Sun Tzu to attack the weakest part of your enemy, General Fonseka opted to instead attack the LTTE’s strongest areas.
“I knew that if we attacked the enemy’s strongest places, then they would put everything into holding it. It was only then that we could inflict maximum casualties. That is why I selected the western flank of Vavuniya as a front,” he said.
Next, the Army attacked from Mannar where the LTTE controlled a large stretch of paddy fields. Capturing this area was of paramount importance as he felt that without the paddy fields, the LTTE would lose the people’s faith.
“For about one year we endured heavy fighting but didn’t move an inch. We were inflicting a large amount of casualties on them. The Commander-in-Chief never realised the value of fighting this way.”
Even before the victory in the east was completed, General Fonseka had committed an additional division to the north. With the imminent eastern victory, he felt it was important to strengthen the northern forces to ensure that the LTTE cadres in the north were not able to move east to strengthen their depleting numbers.
Preparing a trusted chain of command
Army promotions were always given as per seniority in the past. However, General Fonseka carefully selected his senior officers by identifying those who could understand and carry out orders well and those who were able to stay at the forefront for extended periods.
“I went against seniority. I selected those with experience in the field so that they would be able to understand my instructions. They wouldn’t have been the best when it came to their characters or their private lives. Sometimes they wouldn’t be too attached to their families, but I saw this as an advantage,” he said.
He realised quickly that it was beneficial for him to appoint field officers and generals who were able to stay away from their families for longer periods during such a pivotal stage of the war. Forgetting their personal shortcomings was important to make the best decision possible for the realities the Army had to face.
Meanwhile, the Army and Police Intelligence Units were well-trained and competent but the General found that since they were unaware of the ground realities on the battlefront, they were also unable to provide the information that the field commanders would find useful.
The General immediately appointed some of the battle-hardened veterans as Intelligence Chiefs, which meant that the Army was receiving more useful intelligence. In fact, he stated that the Army Intelligence Units had provided vital information which allowed the Air Force to successfully target LTTE Political Wing Leader S. Tamilselvan and the Navy to destroy seven LTTE ships.
The Army also had an increased number of platoons, which consisted of 25 soldiers. However, there was a shortage of lieutenants to take charge of them. The General stated that he had to appoint 2,000 corporals and sergeants who had performed 
exceptionally on the field to take control of the platoons.
He found that as the military line advanced more rapidly, a vacuum was created in the rear as there weren’t enough soldiers to protect the areas that were recaptured once the forces moved deeper into enemy territory. The General said that he had to make the tough choice of requesting the wounded soldiers to protect these areas. Around 10,000 wounded soldiers were deployed towards this end. The move was crucial as the soldiers helped protect the supply routes to the frontlines.
Formulating a vision and sticking to a timeline
General Fonseka stated that in the past the military commanders had ideas of destroying terrorism in the country, but never had any cohesive plan on how to do so. Instead, all their might was focused on recapturing areas and attacking other areas, with no real vision or drive to go beyond it. The reactionary nature of the Army had to be changed, according to General Fonseka.
He said that he put in motion his plan that would end the war in a timeframe of three years. However, the Army was able to defeat the LTTE in two years and nine months.
The former Army Commander also took the opportunity to draw parallels between his war-time promises to the people and his pledge to defeat former President Mahinda Rajapaksa.
“In January of 2007, I made a promise to the people that I would not leave this war to the next Army Commander. At the time I had no plans, no resources, and the Army was not ready. Similarly, in 2012 when I came out of prison, I promised to save the country from the dictator and we managed to do that as well,” he said.
He also recalled the impatience shown by former President Mahinda Rajapaksa at the time, who constantly questioned the Commander on his strategies and approach in the search for quick results.
The General also revealed that the former President had requested the Army to declare a two-day ceasefire from 31 January to 1 February 2009. According to General Fonseka, this decision had a devastating impact on the forces as the LTTE staged a devastating counter attack in Nandikadal where they pushed the military five km back. The battle to retake these areas was long, as described by the General, while the lives of around 500 soldiers were lost as a result.
“I think he was trying to please the foreigners who were putting pressure on the country. That day I realised that at any cost, even if I lost my head in the future, I would not allow others to interfere in my battle plan,” he said.
The final stages
Once the terrorists were finally cordoned off in an area of about 1,000x1,000 metres and just a day before the final battle started, the LTTE staged a final attack across the Nandikadal lagoon. By that time however the Sri Lankan Army had placed three defence lines across the area and was easily able to repel the LTTE offensive.
“The next morning we collected about 100 dead terrorist bodies in the lagoon. I believe some of the leading terrorists for whom we could not account could have perished here,” he said.
The General went on to explain the scale of the rescue operations that were conducted by the military during the latter stages. He stated that 275,000 civilians were rescued by the military forces while the Army had to endure severe losses in some instances as soldiers had to control their shooting in the midst of civilians.
“The LTTE kept the civilians as a buffer at all times. Despite the allegation that thousands of civilians were killed during this stage, the Army always focused on saving civilian lives.”
General Fonseka outlined an operation in the final stages of the war where the LTTE had infiltrated the second no fire zone and had forced the Army to plan an operation to extract around 115,000 civilians from behind enemy lines. He stated that around 200 soldiers were killed in this operation as they had no choice but to control their fire against the LTTE.
He also assured that 12,000 LTTE cadres who surrendered during the evacuation operation were left unharmed and received rehabilitation.
According to the data provided by the General in the course of his presentation, around 5,200 Army troops were killed during the final Eelam War, while 23,000 terrorists were killed by them. The former Commander was quick to point out that the Army bore the brunt of the losses during this time while comparing its losses to that of the Navy and Air Force.
“We admit the fact that everybody has contributed. Not only the services but the civilians also contributed. The credit goes to those who sacrificed their lives and those left permanently disabled but by looking at the figures you will know who had to take the brunt of the war and who contributed more,” he said.
The General added that it was not easy losing as many soldiers as they did, noting that strong mental strength was needed to endure such losses.
Budgeting the war
Before General Fonseka took over, the annual budget for defence was around Rs. 80 billion. He stated that it was the same even during the time of the ceasefire. Even with an additional 80,000 troops, he said that he was able to manage the Army for just Rs. 2 billion extra.
“I bought 308 cabs for the forward areas and around 100 bulletproof trucks; tons and tons of ammunition which was of course on credit; communication equipment and about 200 base stations. But we didn’t create much of a burden on the Government by asking for additional money,” he said.
He pointed out that even with less equipment and less troops, the same amount of money was being spent in previous years, adding that the situation only got worse after the war was over. He revealed that even though the previous Government may have allocated much more than these figures during the last stages of the war, the reality was that no new weapons, vehicles or medical equipment were purchased for the Army.
Describing the task of administrating an Army as a logistical nightmare, the General stated that it wasn’t easy managing 50,000 troops on the offensive together with 120,000 troops on the defensive and 30,000 in the peaceful areas. Managing meals, medical facilities and supplying ammunition proved to be difficult tasks.
However, the Army did not neglect anything during this time as it even excelled in sports during the height of the war. According to General Fonseka, it was precisely this attention to detail and relentless strive to fulfil their objectives that rendered the campaign successful.
Pix by Lasantha Kumara
